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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Legacies of empire: Greater France from colonialism to terrorism 
Author: Monica Goodwin (University of Oklahoma 2016) 
  
In this thesis, I argue that the legacies of empire and colonization are 
influencing the development of French identity and are challenging 
notions of contemporary French society. I argue that these colonial 
legacies reached a watershed moment in 1989 with the headscarf 
affair and further provoked violent and socially divisive events such 
as the 2005 riots and the 2015 terrorist attacks.  Furthermore, I 
argue that the effects of France’s colonial past have created a 
psychological empire that is negatively affecting many of France’s 
youths of immigrant origin. As a result of the psychological empire, 
French society is becoming increasingly stratified along ethnic, 
cultural, and political lines. This thesis takes a multidisciplinary 
approach to research on postcolonial French studies, using analysis 
from contemporary news sources, historical documents, literature, 
political events, legal cases, and personal recollections.  
	1 	 	
Introduction  
 
In 2015, France experienced two devastating terrorist attacks 
on 7 January and 13 November (the total death toll reached almost 
150, with over 350 wounded) that exposed the overwhelming social, 
cultural, and political tensions concerning French identity and culture. 
Following the November attack, President François Hollande 
announced that France was at war and promised “terrorism will not 
destroy France, because France will destroy it.” 1  As a result, 
President Hollande declared a state of emergency in France that 
lasted from November 2015 to February 2016, which gave French 
police forces the power “to conduct warrantless house raids” and to 
place “suspicious persons” under house arrest without official 
authorization from a judge. 2  By January 2016, more than 3,000 
house raids were conducted with 400 people subjected to house 
arrest; however, only four investigations into terrorism have been 
																																																								
1 Jethro Mullen and Margot Haddad, “’France is at war,’ President Francois 
Holland says after ISIS attack,” CNN, accessed April 24, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/16/world/paris-attacks/.	2	Amar Toor, “France’s anti-terrorism laws leave Muslims in a state of fear,” The 
Verge, accessed April 24, 2016, gttp://wwwncnn.com/2015/22/16/world/paris-
attacks/.	
	 	 2	
opened.3 Evident from the extreme security measures, the French 
state appears to be doing something, but human rights protection 
groups - such as Human Rights Watch - assert that the France is not 
doing the right thing, as a “vast majority” of people subjected to 
house raids and to house arrests were French Muslims and persons 
of North African descent, 4  and that these laws disproportionately 
impacted the Muslim population. While France is suffering from 
extremely polarized and divisive points of view about the future of 
French identity and culture, French Muslims consistently receive a 
majority of the blame and anger.  
As many French Muslims have expressed sentiments of being 
unfairly targeted by French state and its institutions (over 200 
complaints have been filed with the Collective Against Islamaphobia 
in France - an organization that offers both legal support and 
consulting services, since the November terrorist attacks), a large 
segment of the French Muslim population has also vocalized feeling 
																																																								3	Amar Toor, “France’s anti-terrorism laws leave Muslims in a state of fear,” The 
Verge, accessed April 24, 2016, gttp://wwwncnn.com/2015/22/16/world/paris-
attacks/.	4	“France: Abuses under state of emergency,” Human Rights Watch, accessed 
April 28, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/03/france-abuses-under-state-
emergency. 
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alienated by the dominant cultural response following the attacks.5 
For example, in January 2016, the French interior ministry released 
figures that show that “400 anti-Muslim crimes were committed last 
year [2015] in France,” which is more than three times the number of 
anti-Muslim attacks committed in 2014.6 Further unrest is evident 
from the social divide concerning the “I am Charlie” slogan that 
became popular following the January attacks on the Charlie Hebdo 
headquarters. Instead of paying tribute to those associated with 
Charlie Hebdo, some segments of the population preferred the 
slogan “I am Ahmed” - the Muslim police officer who was also a 
victim of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack - and stated that “I am not 
Charlie, I am Ahmed, the dead cop. Charlie ridiculed my faith and 
culture.”7 The growing societal polarization and political and religious 
extremism indicates a “rediscovery” of France’s colonial era, as it 
																																																								5	Amar Toor, “France’s anti-terrorism laws leave Muslims in a state of fear,” The 
Verge, accessed April 28, 2016, 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/29/10860964/france-state-of-emergency-muslim-
paris-attacks. 
6 Ibidem.	
7	Anne Penketh, “Policeman Ahmed Merabet mourned after death in Charlie 
Hebdo attack,” The Guardian, accessed April 28, 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/08/ahmed-merabet-mourned-charlie-
hebdo-paris-attack. 
	 	 4	
must confront its “colonial past in order to get on with its future.”8 As 
Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold state, “nowhere in Europe are 
the tensions greater than in constitutionally secular France, with as 
many as six million Muslims,” and “a painful colonial history in 
Algeria… and North Africa.”9   
In this thesis, I argue that France is suffering from the 
closeness of its colonial past and has perpetuated the existence of a 
psychological empire that continues to influence contemporary 
social, political, and cultural aspects of French society, particularly 
pertaining to French identity and ideas of cultural (in)compatibility. I 
argue that contemporary issues such as the headscarf affair, the 
riots in the banlieues, and the terrorist attacks have acted as a 
catalyst for the increased visibility of social and political stratification 
and have strengthened the psychological empire, as well as 
perpetuating contemporary imperial mindsets. Furthermore, I 
contend that French overseas departments and territories are 
additionally challenging perceptions of French identity and 																																																								
8 Robert Aldrich, “Conclusion: The colonial past and the postcolonial present,” in 
The French Colonial Mind: Volume 2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2011), 348.  
9 Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold, “Dangerous Moment for Europe, as fear 
and resentment grow,” The New York Times, accessed April 28, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/paris-attack-reflects-a-
dangerous-moment-for-europe.html. 
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nationality, as these regions consistently vocalize the desire for 
greater autonomy and recognition of cultural differences while 
continuing to vote to remain a part of the French Union and 
community. Additionally, I posit that far-right, extremist political 
parties, such as the Front National, are contemporary 
representations of imperial mindsets that are contributing to the 
polarization of French society by capitalizing on the growing 
sentiments of fear and instability.  Exploiting its associations with 
colonial-era cultural mindsets, the Front National continues to gain 
power, as a result of the psychological empire and the growing 
schism within French society.  
 
Methodology and paper structure 
 This thesis takes a multidisciplinary approach to research on 
postcolonial French studies, using analysis from contemporary news 
sources, historical documents, literature, political events, legal cases, 
and personal recollections. Although there is a need for continued 
research on issues within contemporary French culture, French 
identity, and the effects of France’s colonial legacy, by taking a 
multidisciplinary approach, my thesis will offer a unique perspective 
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on the widespread social and political effects of colonialism and will 
contribute to future research on the subject. 
 Chapter one of my paper will argue that the effects of the 
contemporary psychological empire within France has reached a 
breaking point that has lead to radicalized and divisive segments of 
society concerning French society, culture, and politics. Confronted 
with the closeness of its colonial past, the struggle between minority 
and majority groups within French society is now manifesting in 
increased levels of radicalized violence by minority groups and 
subsequent displays of oppression by the French state. In chapter 
two, I discuss the French overseas departments and territories and 
argue that these overseas regions demonstrate the fluidity and 
evolving perceptions of French identity and nature. Remnants of the 
colonial era, these regions exhibit the desire to remain connected to 
the French state, yet continue to present alternate visions of the 
French nation outside of metropolitan France. Despite a history of 
anti-colonial and anti-France political and social movements, these 
regions continue to offer alternate means of navigating French 
identity. In chapter three, I argue that far-right, extremist political 
movements have fundamental connections to France’s colonial past 
	 	 7	
and contribute to the presence of colonial-era mindsets within the 
contemporary psychological empire. Calling for anti-immigration and 
anti-Islamic policies, the far-right is support by colonial-era 
enthusiasts and segments of French society who have become 
burdened by fear of the Other.   In conclusion, I posit that France 
must confront and acknowledge the negative implications of its 
colonial history on contemporary issues in order to move past the 
tensions and fears that are manifesting in extreme forms of violence 
and social stratification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	 8	
Chapter 1 
 
The contemporary psychological empire in France 
 
Introduction 
 Following a series of socially explosive events that occurred in 
the early 1990s and 2000s, Fadela Amara, leader of the Ni Putes, Ni 
Soumises French feminist movement, commented on the social 
situation of the inhabitants of the French banlieues, stating, “Parked 
in poor neighborhoods, abandoned by politicians… in a parallel 
economy… many young people think their lives are over. They no 
longer believe in a system that continues to exclude them.”10 The 
combination of the headscarf affair, the 2005 riots in the banlieues, 
and the 2015 terrorist attacks signify a turning point in French society 
and indicate that previously held perceptions of society, identity, and 
politics, are now being contested in twenty-first century France. In 
this chapter, I argue that these contemporary events are 
fundamentally linked to France’s colonial legacy and colonial-era 
																																																								
10 Fadela Amara, Breaking the Silence: French Women’s Voices from the Ghetto 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 90.   
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perceptions of culture and identity, creating a psychological empire 
that stratifies French society along racial and religious lines.   
In this chapter, I will first begin with a the series of French 
public school headscarf affairs, starting with the initial event of 1989 
and ending with the ratification of the 2004-228 law banning all 
ostensible signs of religious affiliation. I argue that the headscarf 
controversies demonstrate a moment of increasingly visible social 
and religious divisions within France that are effects of the 
psychological empire. Furthermore, I argue that it demonstrates the 
invisibility and marginalization of minority groups, as very few French 
Muslim voices were heard throughout the debate. Next, I will 
examine the 2005 French banlieue riots, positing that contemporary 
French social, political, and geographic divisions are reflections of 
colonial France through the process of alienating and physically 
dividing social groups. Lastly, I will study the series of 2015 terrorist 
attacks within France, arguing that a psychological empire is 
currently manifesting in extremely violent events that provoke the 
polarization of political and cultural views.  
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The Headscarf Affair  
 In 1989, three veiled Muslim schoolgirls were expelled from 
the Gabriel-Havez school in Creil, France “on the grounds that their 
veils were not compatible with the laïque principals of the French 
state schooling system.”11 Although the period from 1989 to 2004 is 
often understood as a “war of the veil,” the three women in question 
were wearing a scarf (a hijab) that covered solely their hair – not 
their face.12 Therefore, the word ‘headscarf,’ rather than the veil, will 
be used throughout this chapter to describe the piece of clothing in 
question. While the three women had consistently worn the 
headscarf to school in the past, the principal, Eugene Chenière, 
stated that “he was upholding and enforcing the values of French 
secularism and republicanism,” and that “the French republic should 
be protected from the ‘insidious jihad’ represented by middle-school 
aged girls wearing the headscarf.”13 While the Muslim community in 
France in 1990 had only reached 4% of the population,14 and with 
only a “few hundred” schoolgirls actively wearing the headscarf in 																																																								
11 Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2010), 16.  
12 Ibidem. 
13 Joan Scott, Politics of the Veil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 22. 
14 “5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe,” Pew Research Center, 
accessed April 28, 2015. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/5-facts-
about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/. 
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public schools,15 this 1989 expulsion was the first of many episodes 
concerning the role of Islam, the headscarf, and education in French 
public schools.  
 After the initial affair, the parents of the girls appealed to the 
Council d’État, which ruled in favor of the girls and defended the 
legal right to wear religious attire at school, citing examples of 
Catholic children historically wearing the crucifix and Jewish boys 
wearing the yarmulke.16 In its ruling, the Council voted to uphold the 
values of French laïcité by ruling that the state would not interfere in 
the affairs of the Muslim schoolgirls and would not attempt to 
intervene in religious practices. 17  Although the issue of laïcité is 
found at the core of the headscarf controversy, there is no single 
definition that properly defines the word. As such, laïcité can have 
multiple interpretations – all of which can be argued as accurate. 
Contributing to complications in understanding the significance of the 
word in French, the English-language does not have a translation for 
																																																								
15 Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2010),18.  
16 Stephen Croucher, Looking Beyond the Hijab (New Jersey: Hampton Press, 
Inc., 2009), 32.  
17 Ibidem. 
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the word. 18  For example, proposed by Jacques Chirac during a 
debate, one understanding of laïcité is that it “expresses our wish to 
live together in respect, dialogue, and toleration.” 19  In contrast, 
others have proposed that “laïcité is the principle of a balance 
between the public sphere and the private sphere,” that “laïcité is 
based on a neutral public sphere, one free of all religious belief,” and 
that it is “an emancipatory process… a light to women imprisoned… 
hope for oppressed minorities.”20 Though conceptions of laïcité differ, 
the common application and interpretation of laïcité during the later 
years of the headscarf debate was one of “freedom of teaching,” 
according to which the “Republican state had to intervene through 
the schooling system to ensure” necessary freedoms. 21  For this 
reason, the French state ultimately voted to legalize the ban of 
headscarves in 2004, insofar as the headscarf within the classroom 
acted as an “inhibitor” to freedom.  
Although the Council d’État initially ruled to protect laïcité by 
not interfering, the French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, later 
																																																								
18 Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2010), 28. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 Ibid., 28 – 29. 
21 Ibid., 30.  
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rejected this decision and decreed, “educators had the responsibility 
of accepting or rejecting veils in the classroom on a case-by-case 
basis.” 22 With this decree, Jospin effectively rejected the stance of 
non-interference previously associated with French laïcité and 
facilitated future attempts to expel French Muslims from school. In 
this instance, Jospin unofficially enabled the perpetuation of a 
postcolonial empire within the French public school system, 
effectually allowing for the ban of symbols associated with Islam – a 
nontraditionally French religion – from the classroom. Though the 
debate concerns all ostentatious religious symbols, female Muslim 
schoolgirls are the main targets of this discussion. By allowing for the 
teachers to decide on a case-by-case basis, Jospin reinforced 
prejudice against Islam and against French students of immigrant 
origin. 
 In 1994, five years after initial headscarf controversy, “the 
same principal from Creil – Eugène Chenière – serving now as a 
deputy for the Rassemblement pour la Republique, proposed a bill 
that would legally ‘ban all ‘ostentatious’ signs of religious affiliation,’” 
																																																								
22 Stephen Croucher, Looking Beyond the Hijab (New Jersey: Hampton Press, 
Inc., 2009), 33.  
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such as the headscarf. 23  Stating that the headscarf served to 
separate “visually and ideologically” Muslims from non-Muslims, the 
Minister of Education upheld the proposal.24 Ten years later, in 2004, 
the “French Senate overwhelmingly passed Law 2004-228” that 
states, “In public school… the wearing of signs or behaviors by which 
pupils express openly a religious membership is prohibited.”25 With 
this law, the Senate argued in favor of upholding laïcité, directly 
contradicting the Council d’État’s interpretation of a non-intervening 
form of laïcité in 1989. According to the French state, the school acts 
as a public domain and should therefore be free of all religious 
symbols, effectively separating church and state. 26  Whereas the 
1989 Council d’État had previously argued that the state should not 
interfere in religious affairs, the 2004 French state argued that laïcité 
could only be upheld when religion did not enter the public domain of 
the school in any aspect. 
 From the beginning of the controversy in 1989 until the legal 
decision to ban all ostensible symbols associated with religion 2004, 
																																																								
23 Joan Scott, Politics of the Veil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 10. 
24 Ibidem. 
25 Stephen Croucher, Looking Beyond the Hijab (New Jersey: Hampton Press, 
Inc., 2009), 33.  
26 Ibidem. 
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opinions on the headscarf permeated the media, but one voice was 
noticeably absent: the voice of the French Muslim schoolgirls. For 
example, in 2003, President Jacques Chirac, assembled the Stasi 
Commission to determine the feasibility of creating a law banning 
religious symbols, as well to launch an “enquiry into the application 
of laïcité” in this context.27 Operating from July 2003 to December 
2003, the Stasi Commission contained 20 members, ranging from 
academics, educational administrators, politicians, lawyers, activists, 
and one business owner, representing both left- and right-wing 
political opinions. 28  The Stasi Commission conducted over 150 
interviews, public and private, and reviewed thousands of letters 
concerning the issue of the headscarf. However, one initial complaint 
aimed at the Stasi Commission concerned the fact that, out of the 
teachers interviewed, the large majority held an anti-veil stance.29 
Furthermore, of the small number of female Muslim schoolgirls given 
a chance to voice their opinion about the role of the headscarf in 
																																																								
27 Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2010), 22.  
28 Ibidem.  
29 Ibidem.  
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school, they all confessed their “humiliation” associated with being 
“forced to wear the veil.” 30  
 Thus, apparent from the lack of pro-headscarf teachers, as 
well as the lack of interviews from Muslim schoolgirls who choose to 
wear the headscarf, I argue that the Stasi Commission served to 
perpetuate ideas of the French “civilizing mission” by “emancipat[ing] 
a generation of Muslim schoolgirls” from the tyranny and oppression 
of Islam, as well as to prevent France from succumbing to an 
“insidious plot to undermined the Republic.”31  The Commission thus 
revived colonial-era fears concerning Islam and led to a decrease in 
the visibility and presence of French Muslims within the metropole. In 
2004, an estimated 5 million Muslims lived in France – approximately 
8 % of the population – and today Muslims remain the “fastest-
growing ethnic group” in the metropole.”32 Although Muslims remain 
a small percentage of the total population, fear of the growing 
presence of the Other, i.e., North African immigrants, began to more 
visibility manifest in the 1970s and 1980s, coinciding with the first 
																																																								
30 Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2010), 22.  
31 Ibid., 23. 
32 Stephen Croucher, Looking Beyond the Hijab (New Jersey: Hampton Press, 
Inc., 2009), 5.  
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headscarf controversy. Due to the economic downturn and 
decreased need for foreign labor beginning in 1973, President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing attempted to halt the influx of immigrants by 
refusing to renew previously approved residency permits,33 a policy 
that ultimately failed. Although France had historically received a 
steady flow of immigrant workers entering the country, immigration 
until this point was largely seen as temporary and economically 
based 34  Thus, when policies failed to successfully stop all 
immigration into France, sentiments of anxiety and anger entered 
some segments of the population, specifically during the economic 
downturn. 
Furthermore, at the end of the 1980s, the French far-right 
political party, the Front National, gained social and political 
recognition that launched immigration into the forefront of French 
politics and French media. For example, arguing to uphold the 
values of traditional French culture, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the National 
Front Party President, called for the “forced repatriation” of 
																																																								33Virginie Guiraudon, “Immigration Policy in France,” Brookings, accessed April 
28, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/07/0101france-
guiraudon. 
34 Richard Derderian, North Africans in contemporary France (NY: Palgrave, 
2004), 10. 
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immigrants.35 Furthermore, Le Pen’s political campaign focused on 
the fundamental differences between Islamic immigrants and 
traditionally Christian French citizens, citing these differences as the 
reason for France’s increasing unemployment and thereby 
scapegoating the North African immigrant population. In addition to 
the increasingly violent and racially charged rhetoric of politicians 
such as Le Pen, between 1980 and 1993, North Africans in France 
“accounted for 78 percent of all officially recorded racial crimes,” 
leading to increased fear and suspicions about the presence of North 
African immigrants and their ability to successfully “integrate” into 
French culture and identity.36 With heightened feelings of doubt and 
fear came an increase in debates about laws and institutions aimed 
to protect “French identity.”  
Thus, it is no surprise that, in 2004, one Stasi Commission 
member stated, “The veil hid a forest, a dense forest, which was 
difficult to penetrate,” and which needed to be controlled by the 
French Republic by means of banning all symbols of the Other, such 
as the headscarf. Although Bernard Stasi conceded that the 
																																																								
35Richard Derderian, North Africans in contemporary France (NY: Palgrave, 2004), 
10. 
36 Ibid., 10 - 11. 
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headscarf could have multiple meanings, he ultimately determined 
that the headscarf was “an instrument of oppression” that needed to 
be removed from the Republic.37 Ultimately, and despite the fact that 
very few schoolgirls were consulted about the act of wearing the 
headscarf, the French stated arrived at the “inevitable conclusion” 
that the headscarf is unsuitable and incompatible with French 
educational structure. As a result the headscarf ban demonstrates 
the power of the “legacy of French colonialism, whose structures and 
administrations were consistently based on the idea that French 
authorities possessed an exact knowledge of the natives’ cultures 
and lives.”38 Without the need to consult Muslim intellectuals and 
community leaders, pro-headscarf teachers, or Muslim schoolgirls 
who chose to wear the headscarf, the Stasi Commission successfully 
convinced President Jacques Chirac of the need to ratify the 2004-
228 Law, certain that they were civilizing and rescuing Muslims from 
the oppression and savagery of North African culture.  
 Unable to extricate itself from its colonial legacy, the 
Commission’s decision to ban the headscarf worked to further 
																																																								
37 Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2010), 41. 
38Ibid., 42.  
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establish a psychological empire of cultural division, establishing 
Islam as oppressive and incompatible with French Republicanism 
and education. While all ostensible forms of religious symbols were 
banned, the implementation of the law served primarily to stigmatize 
and alienate Muslim students. In an effort to uphold Republican 
laïcité, the law instead created a negative educational environment 
where Muslim schoolgirls became the target of prejudice and racism, 
complicating their ability to succeed academically rather than 
liberating them from oppression, rendering them invisible. 
Furthermore, by minimizing the visibility of Islamic symbols and by 
advocating for the survival of traditional French culture and laïcité (as 
seen by Le Pen), French citizens were able to critique Muslim 
immigrants without directly attacking Muslim immigrants and to 
marginalize French Muslims.  
 Beginning in 1989, the headscarf controversies signaled the 
beginning of a cultural revolt and a schism within French society. 
Haunted by its colonial past and forced to confront its history as a 
nation of immigration, France entered the 21st century with a ruling 
that indirectly targeted Muslim schoolgirls, further reinforcing a 
psychological empire that penetrated all social, cultural, and political 
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realms within the metropole. Officially claiming to uphold laïcité 
within French schools and to empower and liberate Muslim 
schoolgirls, the Stasi Commission unofficially hindered the attempts 
for French Muslim females to “integrate” in to French society. 
Considered the official French policy from the mid-1980s to the 200s, 
the policy of integration “encourage[d] immigrants to abide by the law 
but retain their distinctive cultures.”39 Instead of offering liberation, 
the 2004-228 Law resulted in “shame, guilt, and a burning sense of 
injustice,” transforming the school into a center of “hate” and “never-
ending pain.” 40  Furthermore, the policy of assimilation gained 
popularity, which placed pressure on immigrants and French citizens 
of immigrant origin “to adopt quintessentially French behavior and 
traditions.”41 Ignoring the point of view of the Muslim schoolgirls, the 
Stasi Commission successfully silenced and oppressed the very 
audience it was aiming to liberate.  
 																																																								
39Sylvia Zappi, “French government revives assimilation policy,” Migration Policy 
Institute, accessed April 28, 2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/french-
government-revives-assimilation-policy.	
40 Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2010), 33.  
41Sylvia Zappi, “French government revives assimilation policy,” Migration Policy 
Institute, accessed April 28, 2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/french-
government-revives-assimilation-policy.	
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2005 riots  
 On 27 October 2005, while fleeing from the police in the 
Clichy-Sous-Bois banlieue outside of Paris, Bouna Traore (15) and 
Zyed Benna (17) were accidentally electrocuted - an incident that 
sent the nation into a state of emergency due to the violent rioting 
that spread throughout the banlieues of Clichy-sous-Bois, 
Montfermeil, Les Bosquets, and La Forestière. 42  An investigation 
following the incident, “concluded that they [Traore and Benna] had 
not committed any crime, but that they had fled simply because they 
had seen police.”43 From 27 October to 16 November, “more than 
9,000 vehicles, dozens of public buildings and businesses were set 
on fire.”44 Upon declaration of a state of emergency, Prime Minister 
Dominique de Villepin stated that the underlying issue fueling the 
riots was “France’s failure to provide hope” to the disenfranchised 
French citizens with immigrant origins living within the banlieues who 
are unable to find employment or to receive proper social and 																																																								
42 Stephen Croucher, Looking Beyond the Hijab (New Jersey: Hampton Press, 
Inc., 2009),1 - 2. 
43 Angelique Chrisafis, “The trial that could lay bare France’s racial divide,” The 
Guardian, accessed April 28, 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/15/trial-france-racial-divide. 
44Angelique Chrisafis, “Nothing’s changed: 10 years after French riots, banlieues 
remain in crisis,” The Guardian, accessed April 28, 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/nothings-changed-10-years-after-
french-riots-banlieues-remain-in-crisis. 
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cultural recognition from the French state. 45  The 2005 riots 
demonstrated the “hopelessness of a generation” of the French 
youths living in the banlieues of Paris who are experiencing 
continued marginalization and joblessness due to “their address, skin 
color or their parents’ immigrant origins.”46  
Whereas the word banlieue is often translated as “suburb” in 
English, the living spaces are more akin to housing projects.  A 
concept dating to the nineteenth-century, the banlieues were 
conceived in conjunction with the rise of the working-class population 
and the creation of a physically fluid “urban fringe,”47 not based in 
any particular space. Insofar as the majority of the proletariat 
dominated the peripheral areas associated with industrialization, this 
“floating population” was known as the banlieues noires, an 
expression that indicated disease, danger, and otherness.48 By the 
1920s, the banlieues noires transformed into the banlieues rouges – 
still an “undefined space,” yet an area that contained growing cultural 																																																								
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identity characterized by the working-class struggle. 49  However, 
between 1954 and 1975, due to economic and labor needs, 
immigration into France (primarily from North African countries) 
increased from 1.7 million to 4.1 million, resulting in the 
transformation of the banlieues from an “undefined space” 
associated with the working class to physical housing projects within 
zones à urbaniser en priorité (ZUP), or “priority zones for 
urbanization.”50 These ZUP were located outside of the city centers, 
around the periphery of towns, where urbanization and 
industrialization could develop in isolation, away from the middle 
class. While initial critics of the ZUP commented on the pitfalls of the 
physical and social isolation of the housing, as well as the lack of 
transportation lines, few others vocalized dissent or opposition. 51 
Following the initial construction in the 1950s, the banlieues primarily 
were home to single, immigrant Muslim men who believed they were 
working in France temporarily until they could return to North Africa 
and reunite with their families. However, during the 1960s, a family 																																																								
49 Ibidem. 
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regrouping policy gained popularity within the France, as the 
government began to encourage the immigrants to adhere to 
“traditional [French] values and cultural norms.”52 However, many 
immigrants retained their Islamic faith and areas such as cellars and 
garages were converted to Muslim prayer-rooms that ensured the 
survival of the familial Muslim faith and culture.  
Furthermore, with an increasing population and a decreasing 
municipal budget, the conditions of the banlieues rapidly decreased 
and, by 1980, the banlieues transformed into zones of “car stealing, 
violence, theft, drug dealing and riots.”53 Moreover, with the creation 
of grands ensembles – uniform apartment blocks – the banlieues 
became associated with “total disenchantment” and a lack of cultural 
or social identity.54 With the final, physical construction of the grands 
ensembles, one witnesses the return of the banlieues noires and 
their association of otherness, violence, danger, and stigmatization. 
Not only do these banlieues represent a space of geographic 
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alienation, but also they represent social and economic alienation 
that continues to breed violence and hostility.  
 Due to the years of physical and social isolation, one now 
associates the banlieues with la galère, which is defined as a “highly 
volatile sense of detachment and frustration among suburban youths 
produced by an environment that excludes, alienates, and 
stigmatizes.” 55  La galère turns into anger and rage, leading to 
stereotypes of the banlieues that further reinforce a cultural 
separation that becomes impossible to overcome. Beginning in the 
late 1990s, the banlieues began to represent “the rejected, the 
underemployed, and the foreign,” leading to a rebirth of “colonial 
fears concerning Muslims” and the suspicious that the banlieues 
housed future terrorists. 56  Thus, in 2000, France enacted the 
“Vigipirate Operation,” which instituted forced identity checks within 
the metropole. As a result of the institution of forced identity checks, 
the primary targets were Muslims leaving the banlieues and entering 
city centers, leading to further alienation (both geographic and 
cultural) of the inhabitants within the banlieues.  
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 Following the violence that erupted during the 2005 émeutes 
within the banlieues, Azouz Begag – the first cabinet minister with 
North African – observed that “entrenched socioeconomic 
inequalities compounded by widespread ethnic discrimination and 
decades of political neglect had bred a subgroup of disaffected 
youths whose resentment was such that they were ready to erupt 
into violence at the slightest provocation.”57 The base of this group of 
disenchantment youth comprises third-generation teenagers of 
primarily North African origins who were born into the “ethnically 
stigmatized environment” of the banlieues and thus see little to no 
hope of escaping the disenfranchisement.58 While these youths are 
French citizens and have received a French education, “this does not 
prevent them from being ethicized by members of the majority ethnic 
population,”59 as was demonstrated by the creation of the 2004-228 
law banning the headscarf. Rejected by the majority White 
population, these youths become victims of the contemporary 
psychological empire that results in increased hostility and violence 
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between the minority and majority ethnic groups within France. Just 
as the 2004-228 law created a political and social barrier between 
France and Islam, the banlieues serve as a physical and geographic 
barrier between minority and majority groups and strengthens the 
effects of the psychological empire within the metropole.   
 Whether the boundaries are cultural or geographic, 
contemporary racism targeting French citizens of immigrant origin 
exists as a means of constructing “new boundaries and dividing 
lines.”60 Although these third-generation youths are French citizens, 
they continue to receive the treatment of second-class citizens by 
means of political and social prejudice and the geographic and social 
and cultural alienation of the banlieues. Already disadvantaged by 
this physical isolation, the ban against the headscarf acts as an 
additional inhibitor, perpetuating the existence of an empire of 
inequality. While these French youths have adopted the behaviors of 
the dominant culture, successful social mobility is continually 
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hindered by the creation of physical, social, and legal dividing lines, 
leading to anger and protest.61 
 
Ni Putes, Ni Soumises 
 In 2002, Sohane Benziane, an 18-year old female Muslim was 
burned to death in a banlieue of Paris due to “rebellious” female 
behavior.62 Following the murder of Shane Benziane - a victim of the 
hypermasculine, violent, and oppressive behaviors of the men in the 
banlieues - inspired Fadela Amara to found Ni Putes Ni Soumises 
(Neither Whores Nor Submissives) in 2003 as a means of fighting 
against la galère and la rage that has infected the banlieues. In the 
1990s, coinciding with first headscarf controversy, Amara begin to 
notice a deterioration in male-female relationships within the 
banlieues. It is also important to note that, although Amara supports 
women who wear the headscarf, she believes that Islamic religious 
practices should respect the “norms of a secular society,” and 
therefore also supports the ratification of the 2004 headscarf law.63 																																																								
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Amara’s support of the headscarf ban indicates the sheer 
divisiveness of the issue and the complexities surrounding these 
cultural events.  
Hit hardest by the economic downturn, the banlieues began to 
breed physical violence as the younger generation struggled to cope 
with the loss of wages.64 As the older men began to lose jobs as 
well, the former social status and authority associated with economic 
success vanished, and authority transferred to the eldest son within 
each family. With the new authority and power, these young men– 
neglected by the economy and society outside of the banlieues – 
began to impose extremely radicalized, oppressive, and regressive 
rules on the women.  
 As the social and economic injustice reached new heights 
entering the twenty-first century, the male youths within the 
banlieues were met with intersectional forms of prejudice. For 
example, due to their ethnic identities and physical isolation, these 
youths were born into an environment of extreme discrimination that 
created a sense of rejection and invisibility. However, the patriarchal 
structure of families (both French and immigrant) creates an 																																																								
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environment that encourages freedom of movement and action for 
young men.65 Thus, when these men are rejected by mainstream 
society outside of the physical isolation of the banlieues, a sense of 
rage and injustice overwhelm the men, resulting in the manifestation 
of violence and oppression within their physical confines.  
 Furthermore, as these men experience the devastating effects 
of social rejection and isolation, Azouz Begag notes the susceptibility 
of these young men to pursue a radicalized version of Islam that 
provides an outlet for these frustrations. For example, Begag 
discusses the situation of Khaled Kelkal, a young Muslim from the 
banlieues. Murdered by the French police for suspected connections 
to terrorism, Kelkal had previously confessed to feelings of rejection 
and disconnection from society, as well as feelings of resentment for 
this isolation. 66  However, after meeting a Muslim imam, Kelkal 
“became consumed with the desire to destroy… a world that had 
failed to offer him a place.”67 Rejected by the dominant society, the 
banlieues are transforming into an environment that produces 																																																								
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violence, anger, and the desire to avenge dignity and social status. 
Victims of the psychological empire, these younger men lose the 
ability to operate in French society outside of the banlieues, 
experiencing a disenfranchisement from the state that fosters 
disillusionment about future success.   
 
2015 terrorist attacks  
 On January 7, 2015, two French citizens – Chérif and Said 
Kouachi – systematically murdered ten people at the offices of 
Charlie Hebdo (including the editor), and were linked to two other 
murders and violent attacks the following day. 68  Known for its 
provocative illustrations satirizing religion, Charlie Hebdo had 
recently published a sexualized cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed, 
reinforcing the sense of marginalization within some segments of the 
French Muslim community and widening the “culture clash” between 
French freedom of expression and increased acts of religious 
extremism and. Following the terrorist attack, “I am Charlie” became 
a popular slogan; however, some French Muslims stated that it 
“sidelined the Muslim community, feeding into a general sense of 																																																								
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discrimination that… helped create the conditions for radicalization in 
the first place.” 69  Thus, as Azouz Begag stated in Ethnicity and 
Equality: France in the Balance, continued feelings of rejection by 
mainstream society can lead to feelings of resentment and the desire 
to harm those who benefit from the perpetuation of cultural empire 
and colonial conceptions of inferiority associated with Islam and 
French citizens of immigrant origin. Furthermore, following the act of 
terror, the New York Times wrote that the attacks indicated “a sense 
of increasing social and economic marginalization that many cited as 
a root cause of young people drifting toward extremism.”70  
 Months after the January terrorists attack on Charlie Hebdo, 
on 13 November 2015, Paris experienced an additional attack 
consisting of six coordinated attacks dispersed throughout the city.71 
Beginning at the Stade de France, three terrorists attempted to enter 
the stadium wearing suicide belts. Next, at the Bataclan concert hall, 																																																								
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three terrorists opened fire in the venue, murdering eighty-nine 
people and holding twenty hostages. 72  After the Bataclan, the 
terrorists targeted four restaurants and cafes and opened fire on one 
boulevard. The final number of deaths reached 129, with 368 
wounded.73  
 While France recovers from the reality of the multiple terrorist 
attacks in 2015, it is clear that the cultural and political disconnect 
experienced within the banlieues has transmuted into la rage, 
creating a set of divergent populations that no longer belong to the 
same, unified community of France. In the aftermath of these 
attacks, the rhetorical and psychological legacies of colonialism have 
become apparent, specifically within the rhetoric of the far-right 
political party, the Front National, discussed more in-depth in chapter 
3.  
Conclusion 
 Beginning in 1989 with the first headscarf affair, France has 
continued to demonstrate a society reminiscent of a colonial empire 
based on perceived beliefs of cultural incompatibility. With the 																																																								
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ratification of Law 2004-228, French politicians essentially silenced 
the voices of the Muslim community, insisting on liberating Muslim 
schoolgirls from the “oppression” of the headscarf in lieu of 
respecting individual religious freedoms. In doing so, however, the 
French state instituted a legal ban on all “inappropriate” signs of the 
Other, strengthening the existence of a psychological empire that 
promotes social stratification along ethnic and religious lines. 
Furthermore, by legalizing the headscarf ban, French Muslim 
schoolgirls are rendered invisible, based on the fact that many young 
women are unable to attend school unless they are wearing the 
headscarf.  Additionally, as indicated from the 2005 riots in Paris, the 
lack of attention given to the French banlieues has perpetuated the 
notion of geographic and social isolation, disadvantaging the 
younger generations within the banlieues from accessing French 
society in a meaningful way. Instead, these younger generations are 
finding refuge through the exertion of violence and in extreme and 
radicalized forms of religion. Additionally, evident from the series of 
the 2015 terrorist attacks, French citizens of immigrant origins are 
attempting to exert control and to gain recognition and visibility with a 
region that has perpetually been a source of rejection, 
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disenfranchisement, and prejudice. Unable to penetrate French 
society, French youths are left competing against the contemporary 
psychological empire.  
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Chapter 2 
French overseas departments, regions, and 
collectivities 
 
Introduction 
 Known as the DOM-TOM, or the DROM-COM, or the DOM-
TOM-COM, the French Republic includes a group of overseas 
departments, territories, and collectivities that are considered 
sovereign French territory. With varied levels of legal status and 
levels of autonomy, the DOM-TOM represent a diverse French 
population, as well as a unique perspective on the legacies of French 
empire. Benedict Anderson states that, though the concept of 
nations and nationality are “notoriously difficult to define,” one 
proposed definition would be an “imagined political community,” as 
“members of the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion.” 74  Furthermore, Anderson 
argues that the concepts of nationality and nation-ness are “cultural 
artefacts” that are “capable of being transplanted… to a great variety 																																																								
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of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly 
wide variety of political and ideological constellations.”75 Although the 
French overseas departments and territories began as colonial 
conquests, these regions are now inherently a part of the French 
national consciousness, participating and sharing in the image of 
their communion. However, while the departments and territories 
continually vote to remain within the French Union – as seen in 2009 
with Mayotte and 2010 with Martinique – traces of imperial France 
continue to linger and manifest in political movements and social 
unrest that challenge traditional perceptions of French identity and 
community.  
 In this chapter, I argue that the DOM-TOMs embody the 
fluidity and complexity of French identity, while at the same time 
challenging the notion of nation and community. Although many 
DOM-TOMs often vocalize the desire for greater autonomy and 
control within the region, these departments and territories 
consistently vote to remain unified with the French Union and 
community. In this chapter, I will begin with a brief history on the 
origins of the French overseas departments and territories and their 																																																								
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relation to the French empire. Beginning as French colonies, the 
overseas departments and territories have evolved to become 
extensions of the French Republic. I will offer examples of 
departments and territories, examining the differences in pursuits for 
autonomy or French unification within the regions. I will then discuss 
the implications of the Négritude and Créolité movements as cultural 
manifestations of political desires to separate from colonial France, 
while still remaining connected to the French community and nation.  
 
Historical overview  
 Officially becoming the Départements et Régions d’Outre-Mer 
– Collectivitiés d’Outre Mer in 2003 (DROM-COM), the most often 
expression associated with these countries as the Départements et 
Territoires d’Outre-Mer (DOM-TOM). In addition, there are also Pays 
d’Outre-Mer (POM). Consisting of 11 different major DOM-TOMs, the 
list includes:76 
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French Guiana DOM 
Guadeloupe DOM/ROM 
Martinique DOM/ROM 
Reunion Island DOM 
Mayotte DOM/COM 
Wallis-and-Futuna COM 
Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon COM 
Saint-Martin Island COM 
Saint-Barthelemy Island COM 
New Caledonia COM 
French Polynesia COM/POM 
  
Consisting of varied cultures and identities, the French DOM-TOMs 
ultimately represent diversity under the French Republic. For 
example, the French Constitution offers these regions “equal rights 
with and the same legislative identity as any other department in 
metropolitan France, plus a certain amount of freedom which takes 
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account of their specific circumstances.” 77  Allowing departments, 
territories, and collectivities to choose “constitutional legislation a la 
carte,” France offers the DOM-TOMs the ability to “choose their own 
individual roads of development,”78 yet many still argue for greater 
control and regional power.   
 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Mayotte 
 After being placed under the sovereign rule of France in 1658, 
Martinique officially became French domain in 1674 and was ruled 
according to the Pacte Colonial, declaring that “the mother country 
founds and maintains the colonies; the colonies enrich the mother 
country.”79 Once under official Pacte Colonial rule, France began 
shipping supplies and slaves to the French Antilles to support the 
French empire. Similarly to Martinique, Guadeloupe was placed 
under French rule in 1674, becoming a dependency of Martinique 
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until 1775.80 After a series of attacks and losses, Martinique fell to 
Britain in 1762 and 1809, with the French reclaiming definitive rule in 
1814. 81  While also falling to British forces, France eventually 
regained controls of Guadeloupe in 1816. 82  Furthermore, during 
World War II, both Martinique and Guadeloupe followed the 
collaborative Vichy government, only joining the Free French Forces 
in 1943. 83  Both Martinique and Guadeloupe became an official 
French department in 1946 and later gained status as a region of 
France in 1974.84 Considered both a department and a region (DOM-
ROM), Martinique has four arrondissements that are run by an 
elected council. Though Guadeloupe is also considered a 
department and a region (DOM-ROM) of France, Guadeloupe is only 
divided into two arrondissements.  In terms of political 
representation, Martinique and Guadeloupe send representatives to 																																																								
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the French National Assembly, the French Senate, and the 
European Parliament, 85  whereas Martinique also sends a 
representative to the French Economic and Social Council. 86  In 
terms justice systems, the French system of justice fully applies both 
within Martinique and Guadeloupe.  
 Following the Second World War and the contributions of 
Martinique and Guadeloupe to Charles de Gaulle’s Free French 
Forces, movements for independence emerged within Martinique 
and Guadeloupe. However, from 1956 to 1964, struggles for an 
independent Guadeloupe were eventually suppressed by de Gaulle’s 
appeals to remain united under the French union.87 In the 1980s, 
increased acts of violence in the name of independence, as well as 
low levels of economic improvement within Guadeloupe, once again 
initiated talks of separation from the French government, but 
Guadeloupe retained its status as a department. As a concession, 
the French Parliament approved institutional reforms in 2000, 																																																								
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providing more responsibility and autonomy to the local assemblies 
within the department.88 However, in 2003, the two arrondissements 
of Saint-Martin and Saint-Barthelemy voted to secede and to 
become French overseas collectivities (COMS).89 
 In contrast, Martinique experienced a greater fight for 
independence. With Aimé Césaire, one of the founders of the 
Négritude movement, elected as a deputy to the French National 
Assembly in 1946, the voice of independence was more greatly 
heard. 90  In addition, as the economy in Martinique continued to 
depress, more autonomy and control was given to local councils over 
economy, police, and taxation. 91  However, some dissent over 
independence does continue to exist within Martinique. For example, 
in 1992, “a plurality of the island’s voters” voted to ratify the Treaty 
on European Union, contributing to France’s success in joining the 
EU.92 Furthermore, in 2010, Martinique voted against a proposal that 
would grant greater autonomy to the region. Thus, what are the 																																																								
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perceived benefits of remaining a French overseas department, and 
how do these departments and territories perceive the French 
national community? 
 As an overseas department, all inhabitants of Martinique are 
legally citizens of the French Republic. As such, all Martinicans can 
move freely to the metropole for employment, and can also apply for 
Le revenue de Solidarité active – France’s monthly welfare payment 
of €466.93 However, this welfare payment is not equivalent to the 
high cost of local food available in Martinique, and is deemed 
insufficient, leading to growing levels of anger and resentment. In 
addition, the perceived continuation of a colonial rule and high 
employment rates also contribute to feelings of dissatisfaction.  
 For example, though slavery was abolished within Martinique 
in 1848, “societal stratification along race and class lines remain 
deeply entrenched,” despite the fact that the population is estimated 
to be only 5% whites and 95% Creoles. 94  As colonial plantation 
owners controlled most businesses during before the abolition of 
slavery, the white descendants (comprising an estimated 1% of the 																																																								
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Martinique population) continue to control the land, businesses, and 
assets.95 Furthermore, acts of départementalisation and francisation 
contribute to the racial and social problems within Martinique. In this 
instance, départementalisation translates into the “political 
annexation into France,” meaning that most decisions regarding 
quotidian life in Martinique are made within Paris.96 Thus, although 
decentralization laws were ratified and movements toward greater 
autonomy were granted to Martinique in 2009, the majority of political 
and legislative power remains with the Prefect assigned from the 
President within the metropole, as well as “key administrative 
posts.” 97   Additionally, the move toward autonomy over local 
elections has resulted in little change within Martinique, resulting in a 
complete loss of power and representation for the Martinican 
population. The policy of francisation still exists within Martinique and 
marks the inability for Creole and indigenous Martiniquais 
populations to exert cultural or political dominance. Francisation 
began as a “national cultural assimilation policy” that imposed the 																																																								
95 Alfred Wong and Roxanne Gomes, “The intractable social-economic problems of 
Martinique,” Etudes Caribéenes 21(2012), accessed April 28, 2016, 
https://etudescaribeennes.revues.org/5795. 
96 Ibidem. 
97 Ibidem. 
 
	 	 47	
“dominance of French language and culture for the development of 
French identity during the course of territorial consolidation.”98 Thus, 
as Creole voices and identities fight to emerge and remain present 
within Martinique (and Guadeloupe), the long-lasting effects of 
francisation continue to represent the present-day empire and desire 
to diminish cultures that differ from the traditional Gallic, metropolitan 
France. 
 Moreover, though Martinique (as well a Guadeloupe, Reunion, 
and French Guiana) is an official department of France, the 
employment rates are three times higher than unemployment rates 
within the metropole. 99  The high level of unemployment, in 
conjunction with high levels of social unrest, results in high levels of 
emigration out of Martinique and thus greater demands to ratify the 
socio-economic issues lingering from the colonial effects of race and 
class separation. Although though Martinique and Guadeloupe both 
receive benefits of French citizenship, these regions also experience 
negative economic and cultural effects that are a direct result from 
the French Empire. Despite pushing for greater autonomy and 																																																								
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political power, the lingering effects of colonial institutions and power 
continue to exist within the region, creating a sentiment of disconnect 
with the metropole. While these departments remain part of the 
French national identity, Martinique and Guadeloupe continue to 
experience the effects of the postcolonial empire.  
 In contrast to Martinique and Guadeloupe, Mayotte is an 
example of an overseas department that has consistently fought to 
remain unified with and uphold the values of the French Republic.  
1843, France colonized Mayotte and the remaining Comoros Islands, 
but began to administer Mayotte separately after the three 
northernmost islands of Comoros declared independence in 1975. 
100  As a result, in 1976, Mayotte became a special collectivité 
territoriale of France. However, in 1979, the United Nations “passed 
a resolution affirming the sovereignty of Comoros over Mayotte,” 
further supported by the African Union. 101   Nevertheless, a 
referendum was held in Mayotte in 2009, with 95% of Mayotte’s 
citizens voting to gain status as a French overseas department, 
legally taking effect in 2011.  
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 Now officially France’s 101st department, Mayotte is an 
interesting study in the relationship between Islam and the French 
Republic. For example, with a population of 200,000 in 2011, 90% of 
citizens identified as Muslim.102 As tensions seem to increase daily 
within the metropole related to the “incompatibility” of Islam and the 
Republic, in Mayotte, the citizens have continually “sought to 
reconcile Islam and the laws of the French Republic.” 103  For 
example, Adinani Zoubert, an inhabitant of Mayotte, states, “it goes 
without saying that this is a secular state, but the point of a secular 
state is that it guarantees religious freedom. We don’t have to live in 
an Islamic republic to practice our religion.” 104  In order to gain 
departmental status, the inhabitants of Mayotte agreed to “accept 
certain compromises between the Koran and the French civil code,” 
such as setting the legal age of marriage to 18 years, as well as 
abolishing all polygamous marriages.105 Furthermore, in 2010, the 
citizens of Mayotte ruled to abandon the qadi justice system – “the 
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practice of appealing to the authority of qadis or Islamic judges”106 – 
in favor of the judges appointed by the French Republic. In addition, 
the French ban on wearing the burqa (the full body covering) within 
public spaces was also well received, with citizens largely against 
signs of religious fundamentalism.107 Abdoulatifou Aly, the Mayotte 
representative for the French National Assembly, states, “In some 
French suburbs, there are people who want to use Islam as a 
weapon against the West, but that doesn’t mean that our religion is 
by nature opposed to the Republic.”108 Instead, Aly believes that 
Mayotte is a perfect example of the harmony that could be achieved 
within metropolitan France, as Mayotte demonstrates the “capacity to 
integrate difference” and to “assume a fully universal dimension.”109 
 
Négritude, créolité, and identity: Re-imagining the imagined 
community  
 Though politically unified with the French nation, literary 
movements within the overseas departments and territories 																																																								
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represent contempt and cultural rejection of white, imperial France. 
Beginning in the 1930s, intellectuals and authors from Martinique, 
Guadeloupe, and French Guiana “sought for the first time to define 
their cultural identity in terms of their historical and racial affiliations 
with Africa, rather than their political and educational ties with 
France.” 110  Before the official creation of French overseas 
departments and territories, French colonial rule effectively rejected 
the Creole language and culture, perpetuating dominance of 
francisation. Thus, Aimé Césaire, joined by Léon Damas, Léopold 
Senghor, and Birago Diop, forged the Négritude literary movement 
that was “a reaction to the cultural oppression of the French colonial 
system, which aims to reject the French project of cultural 
assimilation and the devaluation of Africa and her culture… 
Negritude is more cultural than political.”111 In this movement, the 
authors reject the historically colonial French presence, acting 
instead to create a kinship with the African diaspora, utilizing terms 
such as “Negro” and “savage” as a means of defying “the prejudices 
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of their likely public.”112  By creating a literary and cultural kinship 
with the African diaspora, writers from regions such as Martinique 
and Guadeloupe are able to reject the European and French 
stereotypes of “race, color, mental and physical attributes,” and to 
create a “spiritual homeland” that unifies all “victims of prejudice, 
abuse, famine, [and] torture.” 113   Furthermore, in creating a 
movement that defies the historical French presence, the followers of 
the Négritude movement also participate in consciously re-imagining 
the imagined community of France. While continuing to remain 
politically French, the movement creates another imagined 
community – this time within the realm of the African diaspora.  As a 
result, Césaire relies heavily on geographic depictions of Martinique 
as a means to “destroy the caricature of those territories in European 
minds,”114 and to physically separate Martinique from the imagined 
community of France. 
 However, some Caribbean authors rejected the Négritude 
movement, as Césaire had wrongly made the assumption that all 																																																								
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“Caribbean non-white individual[s] will opt to be assimilated into the 
African cultural sphere.” 115 This was often not the case, considering 
that French Creole as a language or culture had little to no role in the 
larger picture of Négritude. Thus, in the 1980s, three authors from 
Martinique – Patrick Chamoiseau, Jean Bernabé, Raphaël Confiant 
– published the Eloge de la creolité (In praise of creoleness), which 
stated, “Neither Europeans, nor Africans, nor Asians, we proclaim 
ourselves to be Creole. This will be for us an internal attitude, better: 
a vigilance, or better yet, a type of mental envelope in the middle of 
which we will build our world in full consciousness of the outer 
world.”116  Through the creation of the Créolité movement, writers 
such as Chamoiseau argued that the Négritude movement wrongly 
encouraged the Creole people to identify with a foreign land and 
culture, similar to the assimilation and civilizing mission of French 
colonialists. Thus, with the Créolité movement, the authors became 
more concerned with creating and providing an outlet for Creole 
culture and language, using these tools as a “unifying force” that 
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stemmed from “racial diversity and resisted centuries of imposed 
education” and assimilation to French culture and language. 117  
However, one issue surrounding Créolité is the fact that the 
language has a strong oral tradition, thus only a small minority can 
effectively read or understand works primarily written in Creole. Due 
to this fact, most Créolité works are written in French, yet reflect a 
“creolized” style of identity and voice.118   
As many Creole authors continue to write in French despite 
attempts to create new communities and new identities that are 
distinct from the white French imperialists, these literary movements 
are cultural manifestations that indicate the political inability of the 
overseas departments and territories to separate from the French 
nation or community. According to Anderson, “nothing connects us 
affectively…more than language… There is a special kind of 
contemporaneous community which language alone suggests.” 119 
Although these movements express a desire to find cultural 
autonomy and distance from the Empire, the overseas departments 
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and territories remain unified and connected to the French metropole 
through “imagined sound,” 120  maintaining a national connection 
based on the foundation of a common language.  
 
Conclusion 
 Indicated from the divergent paths of Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
and Mayotte, the French DOM-TOMs represent fluidity of identity 
and differing concepts of nation and community in relation to the 
French metropole. In the case of Martinique and Guadeloupe, cries 
for greater autonomy and improved economic and social status are 
consistently defeated by votes to stay within the French Union and to 
remain a part of the French community. Though legally a department 
of France, the inhabitants of Martinique and Guadeloupe continue to 
experience racial discrimination that is a continuation of former 
colonial French practices within the region. Continued social 
stratification and lack of political autonomy have thus resulted in 
feelings of dissatisfaction and disconnect from the metropole, 
hindering the communion of the French communities. Furthermore, 
literary movements such as Négritude and Créolité conceptualized 																																																								
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within these regions demonstrate the voice of the people attempting 
to find autonomy and identity away from the French colonizer, yet the 
use of the French language within these literary movements act as a 
continual anchor to French community and nation. In contrast, the 
political situation of Mayotte represents a cohesive union, with the 
inhabitants gladly voting to remain joined with France. With over 90% 
of the population identifying as Muslim, Mayotte is able to more 
closely identify with the metropole and with contemporary issues 
surrounding the French community.  Ultimately, the French DOM-
TOMs remain an essential part of the French nation, yet are marked 
by struggles to overcome the postcolonial empire, as well as social 
and political stratification with the region.   
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Chapter 3 
The legacy of the pied-noir and the rise of 
contemporary French extremism 
 
Introduction 
 On December 6, 2015, the Front National placed first in the 
first round of French regional elections, receiving 28% of votes 
nationwide and was projected to lead “races to govern six of 
France’s thirteen regions.” 121  Marking the “highest ever 
performance” 122  for the Front National, the rise of this far-right 
political party signifies the re-popularization of anti-immigrant and 
anti-Islam sentiment spreading throughout France. Though the Front 
National did not succeed in gaining control of any French regions in 
the second (and final) round of regional voting, the party still received 
6.6 million votes which indicates the strength of the party and the 
growing sentiment of dissatisfaction within France. Following the 																																																								
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series of terrorist attacks within Paris, as well as mounting economic 
concerns and unemployment, the Front National “speaks to voters 
who feel economically strained, distant from leaders they perceive as 
elitist and out of touch, and angry or frightened by waves of 
immigration that they feel threaten their national identity and 
personal security,”123 One such group targeted by the Front National 
is the contemporary pied-noir population, a group of repatriated 
European settlers who fought for the continued colonization of 
Algeria by France during the French-Algerian War.  
 Founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Front National 
exists as Europe’s “oldest far-right party,” promoting “discriminatory 
and assimilationist immigration politics,” as well as campaigning for 
the expulsion of “unwanted” immigrants that are associated with 
“Islamization of French society.”124 Shortly after the January 2015 
terrorist attacks, Jean-Marie Le Pen stated that “It was to be 
expected… It’s an episode in the war that is being waged against us 																																																								
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by Islamism.”125 Though Marine Le Pen – Jean-Marie’s daughter and 
current Front National president – has recently severed political ties 
with her father in an attempt to “de-demonize”126 the party, the Front 
National remains ideologically connected to the party that has 
consistently attracted “colonial enthusiasts” and “reactionaries 
longing for some idealized version of France’s proud past.”127 Acting 
as the protector of “traditional” French values, the Front National 
continues to stratify social and political divisions by scapegoating the 
Other within French society and by perpetuating colonial-era ideas of 
cultural incompatibility and intolerance. 
 In this chapter, I argue that the resurgence of Front National 
popularity and its connection to groups such as the pieds-noirs and 
colonial sympathizers demonstrates the existence of a widespread 
psychological French empire that is currently impacting the social, 
cultural, and political arena. Intrinsically connected to colonial beliefs 
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about French cultural superiority, the Front National continues to 
successfully target inhabitants who fear the presence of the Other in 
French society and to consistently link France with legacies of 
colonialism and empire. Receiving support from both historically anti-
colonial populations such as the pieds-noirs, as well as the general 
French population, the rise of the Front National signifies a rise of 
nationalistic and culturally exclusionary sentiments that indicate the 
presence of a psychological empire, fueled by remnants of an 
imperial mindset.  
I will begin by first defining and identifying what is a pied-noir, 
both in the context of the French-Algerian War and in contemporary 
French society. I will then discuss the presence and representation 
of pieds-noirs within Algeria in the pre-decolonization period, 
examining their cultural and political standing. Next, I will discuss the 
current political and social situation of pieds-noirs in the 
contemporary French metropole in terms of political party alignment, 
specifically in relation to the Front National. Lastly, I will examine the 
rise of the Front National and the party’s relation to groups such as 
the pieds-noirs within France.  
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Pieds – noirs in colonial Algeria  
 In 1926, Robert Randau wrote in his work Les Colons, “I am 
an African. I am the law. I am neither a lazy Arab nor a Maltese dog. 
I am a colon.” 128  A part of the Algérianiste literary movement, 
Randau and other authors often depicted these European settlers 
within Algeria (pieds-noirs) as the racially superior civilization, rising 
above the “inferior indigènes” and “lazy criminals who practiced 
primitive customs” that were “inferior” to French civilization. 129 
Images of cultural superiority associated with pieds-noirs were 
present in much of the European literature concerning the Maghreb, 
demonstrating an “idealized vision of Algeria shared by many pieds-
noirs, particularly those identified with the political center and right 
wing.”130  
 In 1830, under a “loose suzerainty of Turkish military rule,” 
Algeria was experiencing severe political instability and internal 
turbulence, due to the fact that the region had been subject to a 
series of “successive conquerors” that had rendered the 
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establishment of national cohesion and national identity 
impossible. 131  Aiming to distract from domestic problems, France 
became entangled in Algerian affairs that lead to the initial Algerian 
conquest of 1830. The fight for total control and victory over Algeria 
lasted until 1847, when the Second French Republic officially 
declared Algeria an “integral part of France” by transforming Algerian 
territory into three French departments.132 By 1841, the number of 
pieds-noirs living in Algeria had reached a total of 37, 374 
inhabitants, many of whom made claims to “fresh water and fertile 
land… without concerning oneself to whom these lands belong.”133   
Furthermore, in A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962, 
Alistair Horne discusses the treatment of the indigenous Algerian 
population by the pieds-noirs:  
Too often he [the Algerian native] was regarded with disdain, 
and from a vantage of superiority; which manifested itself in 
many different ways, and more insidiously among the poorer 
levels of whites where the frictional contact was closest. Bicot, 
melon, figuier, sale raton -- there was a plethora of derogatory 
slang for an inferior race that sprang all too readily to the 
lips… he was incorrigibly idle and incompetent; he only 
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understood force; he was an innate criminal, and an instinctive 
rapist… ‘They can see our women, we can’t see theirs.’134  
 
  During the period of Algerian colonization, the pied-noir 
population was comprised of a mixed spectrum of diverse origins, 
economic background, and political point of views. Although the 
pieds-noirs viewed themselves as culturally diverse and superior, by 
the 1950s, the indigenous Muslim-Algerian population was 
repopulating at ten times the rate of the European settlers, who only 
represented 11% of the total population.135  As a result, the pieds-
noirs became overwhelmed with the fear of becoming 
demographically outnumbered and aligned themselves in staunch 
political opposition to French assimilationist and integrationist policy 
proposals in Algeria. Furthermore, in 1947, the proposal of a loi-
cadre (the law intended to provide autonomy and self-governance to 
indigenous Algerian populations), marked the beginning of a series 
of strikes and political opposition movements led by the pieds-noirs 
ultras – staunch integrationist oppositionists – that would last until 
Algerian independence. Ultimately, the pieds-noirs believed 
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themselves to be civilized in superior to indigenous populations, 
resisting all political movements to offer Algeria autonomy or 
independence.  
 Following years of violent warfare and the Algerian struggle to 
emancipate itself politically from France, the signing of the Evian 
Accords in 1962 resulted in Algerian independence and the mass-
migration and exodus of colons and pieds - noirs to metropolitan 
France. With only two suitcases per person, over 1, 380, 000 pieds-
noirs “queued day and night for passages out of the country they had 
been born in.”136 However, this exodus symbolized a return to land 
that was never considered home; born in Algeria, these pied-noir 
communities were French without ever experiencing France. Similar 
to the treatment of indigenous Algerians by pieds-noirs, the native 
Frenchmen often referred to the presence of the pied-noir community 
as an “alien race,” as “threatening competition,” and as “dirty pieds 
noirs” who were subjected to extreme poverty due to the minimal 
state assistance given by France.137  
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In the September 2012 issue of l’algérianiste (a contemporary 
pied-noir publication) commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 
exodus from Algeria, Georges Dillinger shares personal recollections 
of the “return” to France, writing:  
As for us, we remember the exodus and we do not need the 
50th anniversary to awaken the memory. But it gives us the 
opportunity to speak of it and to express our pain… the 
exodus was, in the vast majority of cases, leaving with only 
two suitcases and a shoulder bag or small suitcase, with one 
hand guiding the children who did not understand, questioning 
their parents and crying. The exodus, it was for close to a 
million of us, the abandonment of our homeland.138 
 
Furthermore, Dillinger writes, “many have known suffering… and 
demoralization, the rage in the heart in the presence of this 
environment of French people, indifferent when they weren’t 
hostile.”139 Embittered by the loss of French colonial control over 
Algeria, the pied-noir population experienced misery within 
metropolitan France and hostility from the native French population 
who viewed the pieds-noirs as exploiters.140 
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Pieds-noirs and the rise of the Front National in contemporary 
France  
 Attempting to settle into metropolitan French life after the 
exodus, one pied-noir wrote of her experience, “At this time, 
everything revolted me. I was always making comparisons between 
Algeria and France… I hated everything.”141 Further contributing to 
the struggle to adapt to life within the metropole is the perpetuation 
of a “nostalgeria,” which is the constructed “heroic history” of the 
pied-noir population within Algeria during the time of colonization and 
asserts their “victimization” upon Algerian independence.142 Despite 
the struggle to adapt to life within the metropole, according to the 
2014 electoral lists, 1.8% - or 80,000 potential voters - of the French 
population continued to identify as pied-noir.143 Furthermore, 7% of 
the French population declared belonging to the pied-noir 
community, meaning that at least one parent or grandparent self-
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identified as pied-noir, which translates to a potential of 3.1 million 
voters in elections.144  
Thus, what is the significance of the pied-noir vote within 
contemporary French politics and society, and how does it contribute 
to the perpetuation of an imperial mindset? According to an analysis 
of the past presidential elections, the pied-noir vote consistently 
orients to the political right or far-right.145 In an open-letter written in 
2014, Marine Le Pen acknowledges the “tragic history” of the pieds-
noirs, writing: 
 
Letter to my pied-noir friends… I will not go to the tomb of 
General de Gaulle out of respect for the criminal 
abandonment of the pieds-noirs and the harkis who have 
suffered so much from his Algerian policies… we seek to join 
together… I forget nothing, I have a much respect for your 
tragic history… I embrace you and count on your support.146 
 
 
Manipulating the “nostalgerie” of the pied-noir community, Marine Le 
Pen and the Front National continue to appeal to the colonial 
mindset of French cultural superiority and tragedy surrounding 																																																								
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Algerian independence. As minority groups within France have 
begun to question the success of French assimilation and 
integration, the present-day pied-noir community continues to 
demonstrate a perpetuation of colonial fantasies within France, as 
many “look back with nostalgia on the colonial days before the war… 
they want to be seen as guardians, keeper of a bygone French 
nationalism.”147 
 Although today’s pieds-noirs have a clear connection to the 
xenophobic and anti-immigrant rhetoric espoused by the Front 
National, it is clear that the colonial and nationalistic rhetoric utilized 
by the political far-right also resounds with a part of the population 
that has no immediate connection to the Algerian War or to the fight 
against decolonization. Presenting itself as the “protector of France,” 
French inhabitants that resist contemporary visions of a multicultural 
and integrationist France are now flocking to support the Front 
National, indicating deep-rooted colonial fears embedded within 
French society. As the pieds-noirs criticized Islamic practices (“They 
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can see our women. We can’t see theirs.”148), so does the Front 
National critique the visibility of Islam within the metropole.  
For example, following the terrorist attacks at the Charlie 
Hebdo headquarters, Marine Maréchal Le Pen (Jean-Marie’s 
granddaughter) stated that “today, we can see that immigration has 
become favorable terrain for the development of Islamism,” 149 
implying synonymy between Islam and terrorism. Capitalizing on the 
recent terrorist attacks, as well as the stagnant economy and high 
levels of unemployment, the Front National presents itself as a party 
“for the people,” easily able to scapegoat France’s history of 
immigration as the main source of France’s domestic problems. As 
the pieds-noirs believed indigenous Algerians to be lazy criminals, 
incompatible with French civilization, four out ten French citizens 
surveyed believe that “Muslims are a threat to our [French] identity,” 
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which ultimately proves that the power of the Front National and 
Marine Le Pen are no longer a “political joke.”150 
 
Conclusion 
 Historically on the side of the colonizer and believing in the 
superiority of French culture and civilization over native Algerian and 
Maghrebi populations, French pieds-noirs represent a remnant of 
France’s imperial past that is once again finding popularity in 
contemporary French politics. Receiving its highest ever 
performance in the 2015 regional elections, the Front National is 
making political gains by appealing to colonial enthusiasts (such as 
the pieds-noirs) and by capitalizing on the fear associated with the 
rise of violent events, such the 2015 terrorist attacks within France. 
Proposing a vision of France that is anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and 
anti-Other, the rise of the Front National indicates a shift in French 
perceptions of identity, reverting to colonial-era perceptions of race 
and culture. Once perceived as a political joke, the Front National is 
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growing in popularity and is manifesting as the leader of a 
psychological empire within France.  
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Conclusion  
Liberté, égalité, fraternité? 
Continuously haunted by its imperial legacy, contemporary 
France is suffering from the existence of a psychological empire that 
is proliferating social stratification and increasingly radicalized views 
of religion, politics, society, and identity. Both metropolitan France 
and the overseas departments and territories are grappling with 
issues of identity and nation, which have manifested in increasingly 
violent and extremist displays of anger and fear. From the 
politicization of religion to the declaration of two states of emergency 
following instances of social upheaval and terror, the French nation 
must confront its colonial past and acknowledge the existence of a 
psychological empire that continues to prejudice and marginalize 
large segments of French society. Although France is no longer 
exerting official imperial control, French society continues to, and will 
continue to, suffer from the anxieties and fears of a contemporary, 
postcolonial empire.  
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